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Abstract 
International strategic alliances have grown increasingly popular in recent decades, yet their 
failure rate is extremely high. Poor management of adverse situations contributes significantly to 
such high failure rates. Moreover, the international environments in which international strategic 
alliances operate exacerbate the adverse situations and make their management more critical. 
However, extant research does not specify how people from different national cultures respond to 
these adverse situations. In order to better understand cross-national differences, this study 
investigates future managers’ preferences for specific response strategies in an international 
strategic alliance experimental context. Using a scenario-based experiment with 1,379 business 
students in five countries—Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom—the authors assess whether preferences for seven response strategies—exit, 
opportunism, aggressive voice, creative voice, considerate voice, patience, and neglect—vary 
across countries. The results indicate that national culture, both directly and interactively through 
relationship-level exchange variables that characterize the adversity of the situation, influences 
response strategy preference. This study advances literature on response strategies by explaining 
that when faced with the same adverse situation, future managers from different countries likely 
prefer different response strategies, depending on which response strategies they believe are most 
adequate in their cultural environment. 
Keywords: International strategic alliances, national culture, response strategies, exchange 
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variables. 
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1. Introduction 
International strategic alliances (ISAs) are voluntary, long-term, contractual, cross-border 
relationships between two firms, designed to achieve specific objectives through collaboration 
(Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006). Because of their ability to capitalize on cross-border 
opportunities, ISAs have grown increasingly popular, yet their failure rate remains high (Park and 
Ungson, 2001). One of the key drivers of such failures is a lack of sensitivity to cultural 
differences while managing adverse situations (Jiang et al., 2008; Meschi, 1997). When faced 
with an adverse situation (e.g., low economic performance, poor relationship quality), managers 
in an ISA must understand how national culture influences their partners’ responses to adversity 
so they can reduce the likelihood of their alliances’ failure. Because ISAs take place within 
unique socio-cultural contexts, managers also must consider normative beliefs about how people 
should behave during interactions, which differ across countries (Doney et al., 1998; Thomas and 
Au, 2002). Surprisingly then, despite the popularity of ISAs and reports of their high failure rate, 
we have a limited understanding of how national culture influences people’s responses to adverse 
situations (Aharoni and Brock, 2010; Nakos and Brouthers, 2008). 
In an ISA’s context, previous studies have examined the influence of national cultural 
differences between partners on relationship development (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; 
Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006; Meschi, 1997), but they have not systematically identified how 
people respond to adverse situations nor how culture influences their preference for certain 
responses. For example, Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) demonstrate that cultural differences 
between partners increase the likelihood of alliance termination, because differences breed 
disagreement and conflicts. However, they only focus on alliance dissolution, without examining 
other possible responses aimed at avoiding dissolution. Brouthers and Bamossy (2006) show that 
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within the context of Eastern–Western European joint ventures, cultural differences exacerbate 
the detrimental effect of adverse situations, but their results indicate that managing adverse 
situations and cultural differences fosters relationship development and reduces the likelihood of 
alliance failure. However, their study does not detail the different response strategies that might 
help manage adverse situations. To better understand how adverse situations can be managed in 
international strategic alliances, we require more insight into the relationship between national 
culture and response strategies. 
To address this concern, we draw on response strategy literature in which response strategies 
refer to the unique sets of responses that one party in a relationship uses to deal with adverse 
situations (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Ping, 1993; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). Extant response 
strategy literature has focused on the effect of relationship-level exchange variables (i.e., distinct 
types of adversity), such as partners’ satisfaction and exit barriers, on preferences for response 
strategies (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Hibbard et al., 2001; Ping, 1993; Tjemkes and Furrer, 
2010; Zhou and George, 2001). However, these studies usually implicitly assume that in a given 
situation, people from any country respond the same way (Boyacigiller and Adler, 1991). Thus, 
neglecting the issue that national culture is also likely to influence perceptions of the relative 
importance of exchange variables (Thomas and Au, 2002; Thomas and Pekerti, 2003). 
Thus, we develop and test a set of hypotheses that specify direct and interaction effects 
among national culture (i.e., country), the relationship-level exchange variables that characterize 
adverse situations, and response strategies. That is, we first propose that national culture directly 
affects response strategy preference. Second, we examine national culture’s moderating effect, 
through economic and social satisfaction, alliance-specific investments, and alternative 
availability. The empirical results of a scenario-based experiment with business students (i.e., 
future managers) from five countries, namely, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and 
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the United Kingdom, demonstrate that national culture not only directly influences response 
strategy preferences but also increases sensitivity to particular types of adverse situations, thus 
moderating the effect of the situation on preferences for certain response strategies. 
We use a scenario-based experimental design and business students to test our hypotheses for 
several reasons: Given the broad variety of ISAs that exists, both in terms of types and 
governance forms, an experimental design allows us to control for extraneous factors and 
confounding effects (Croson et al., 2007; Joardar et al., 2007). In addition, as our hypotheses 
pertain to fundamental processes concerned with basic and relative stable characteristics of 
human nature (Bello et al., 2009), which are not specific to ISAs but to more general 
interpersonal relationships, business students who represent future managers are a pertinent 
population to study response strategies in a strategic alliance context. Furthermore, the use of a 
homogeneous sample of business students allows us to improve internal validity (Croson et al., 
2007). Moreover, business students are also more likely to only respond to the manipulations 
than actual managers, whose responses may be contaminated by past experience with a specific 
existing alliance (Bateman and Zeithaml 1989). The use of an experimental design with business 
students, however, might raise the issue of external validity. To alleviate this issue, we test two 
important assumptions of our experimental design by conducting a survey of actual alliance 
managers. This survey allows us to assess the validity of our measures of response strategies and 
the direct effects relationship-level exchange variables that are manipulated in the experiment. 
The results show that the response strategy measures are valid and that the effects of the 
exchange variables are as expected. 
Accordingly we advance response strategy literature by demonstrating that national culture 
influences people’ perceptions of the adversity of the situation, with an accordant interactive 
effect on their response strategy preferences. By shifting the focus of our research from assessing 
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the overall effect of cultural differences on the adverse situation to the underlying direct and 
moderating mechanisms by which national culture influences response preferences, our study 
demonstrates that when faced with the same adverse situation, respondents from different 
countries are likely to prefer different response strategies, depending on which strategies they 
believe are most adequate in their cultural environment. Even if our results are obtained from 
business students in an experimental context, they concern fundamental processes that are likely 
to be present in actual ISAs. Therefore, the recognition of these cultural effects is useful to help 
international strategic alliance managers, because with a better understanding of the behavioral 
intentions of their foreign partners, as well as their own preferences, they can better overcome 
adverse situations. 
We organize the remainder of this article as follows: In the next section, we define and 
classify response strategies. Then we introduce cultural dimensions to develop hypotheses about 
their direct and moderating effects on preferences for response strategies. In the method section, 
we describe the sample and the design of the scenario experiment we use to test the hypotheses. 
Finally, we present the results and conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial 
implications of our study, along with limitations and directions for further research. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Response strategies 
Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty framework provides the foundation for an 
important stream of research on response strategies. Hirschman initially represented exit, voice, 
and loyalty as three alternative strategies along a constructive–destructive spectrum (Leck and 
Saunders, 1992). Extending Hirschman’s framework with a fourth strategy, Farrell (1983) and 
Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983) propose the ELVN (exit–voice–loyalty–neglect) typology, which 
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represents a parsimonious conceptualization of response strategies and derives its strength from 
the underlying two-dimensional structure into which the four response strategies are organized: 
an active–passive and a constructive–destructive dimension. In later studies, three types of voice 
have been distinguished: considerate, creative, and aggressive voice (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; 
Zhou and George, 2001). Opportunism also joins the typology as an active–destructive strategy 
(Ping, 1993). Thus, seven response strategies appear in previous literature: exit, opportunism, 
aggressive voice, creative voice, considerate voice, patience, and neglect (Tjemkes and Furrer, 
2010). 
Exit indicates a disinclination to continue the current relationship (Hirschman, 1970), which 
is the ultimate and most destructive response to an adverse situation. It can be either active or 
passive (Hagedoorn et al., 1999). By exiting the alliance, partners dissolve their relationship and 
must find alternative ways to achieve their objectives (Rusbult et al., 1982; Withey and Cooper, 
1989). Opportunism represents an active–destructive response (Wathne and Heide, 2000), 
because it is an active attempt to increase benefits from the alliance in ways that are explicitly or 
implicitly prohibited (Ping, 1993). Three types of voice represent three additional strategies: 
aggressive, creative, and considerate (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010; Zhou 
and George, 2001). Considerate voice is constructive and slightly active and represents an 
attempt to change, rather than escape from, the adverse situation by communicating in a 
relationship-preserving manner and cooperatively discussing problems (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; 
Ping, 1993). Aggressive voice is more destructive and more active; it refers to the forceful 
imposition of views on alliance partners, without trying to avoid conflicts (Hagedoorn et al., 
1999; Hibbard et al., 2001). The third type of voice, creative voice, pertains to the generation of 
novel and potentially useful solutions to address the situation, which makes it both active and 
constructive (Zhou and George, 2001). With patience, a partner silently abides the issues, with 
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the confidence that things will improve in the future (Hibbard et al., 2001; Ping, 1993). It requires 
voluntarily ignoring the issue, in the hope that the adverse situation resolves itself, and the belief 
that undesirable circumstances are transitory phenomena that dissipate over time (Ping, 1993). It 
thus is constructive and passive. Finally, neglect is passive but destructive, because it allows a 
relationship to deteriorate (Rusbult et al., 1982). A neglectful manager believes that the alliance 
does not deserve to be salvaged and expends little effort to keep it afloat (Ping, 1993; Pressey and 
Qu, 2007). 
2.2. Adverse situations and exchange variables 
Building on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and interdependence theory (Thibaut and 
Kelley, 1959), Rusbult and colleagues (Rusbult and Farrell, 1983; Rusbult et al., 1988) propose 
that preferences for active–passive and constructive–destructive response strategies depend on 
relationship-level exchange variables that characterize the nature of the adverse situation. Over 
time, their investment model has been tested empirically in several contexts, including job 
satisfaction (Rusbult and Farrell, 1983; Rusbult et al., 1988), romantic relationships (Rusbult and 
Zembrodt, 1983), channel relationships (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993), and 
strategic alliances (Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). Among these studies those focusing on alliances 
identified four exchange variables that influence preferences for response strategies: economic 
satisfaction, social satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, and alliance-specific investments. 
These exchange variables represent different adverse situations in ISAs to which managers must 
respond. 
Economic satisfaction pertains to managers’ evaluation of the financial outcomes of an 
alliance (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). According to Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000), an 
economically satisfied manager considers the alliance a success with respect to goal attainment, 
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effectiveness, productivity, and the resulting financial outcomes. Prior response strategy research 
has produced results indicating that economic satisfaction influences managers’ response 
preference on the active–passive dimension but not on the constructive–destructive one. Low 
economic satisfaction implies that managers perceive a discrepancy between prior expectations 
and desired financial results (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000), which requires an active response 
to improve the situation rapidly (Das, 2006; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). However, this active 
response could be destructive, such as acting opportunistically to extract additional financial 
benefits, or constructive, such as using creative voice to find new ways to solve the situation. 
Regardless of how they do it, managers are more likely to “rock the boat” to restore performance 
and increase their economic satisfaction, instead of waiting patiently for the situation to improve 
(Ping, 1993). In contrast, managers who are satisfied with the economic performance of the 
alliance likely behave passively (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010); 
they can either be patient or neglect the issue. 
Social satisfaction pertains to managers’ evaluations of the psycho-social aspects of an 
alliance; it implies that interactions with counterparts are fulfilling, gratifying, and facile 
(Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). Managers’ perceptions of relational quality affect their social 
satisfaction; if relational quality is poor, the alliance suffers dysfunctional conflicts, distrust, and 
low commitment (Ariño et al., 2001). Empirical results suggest that social satisfaction in turn 
influences the constructive–destructive dimension but not the active–passive one. Low social 
satisfaction creates greater suspicion about a counterpart’s intentions and reduces expectations 
about the potential future benefits of the relationship (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). 
Therefore, managers dissatisfied with relationship quality may terminate the relationship rather 
than try to save it through constructive responses (Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). To do so, they can 
respond destructively, either in an active way by acting opportunistically or in a passive way by 
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exiting the relationship or being neglectful. Partners satisfied with the relationship instead 
appreciate the contacts with their counterparts, and the relationship likely is characterized by 
trust, respect, and commitment (Ariño et al., 2001). In such a situation, managers should use 
constructive response strategies (Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006), whether active or passive. For 
example, Hibbard and colleagues (2001) argue that managers with positive views of a 
relationship place less importance on an adverse situation and instead remain patient, believing 
that the transient negative situation will improve. Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) confirm that 
socially satisfied managers are more likely to use creative or considerate voice. 
Alliance-specific investments represent sunk costs that cannot be redeployed easily to another 
alliance without some sacrifice in the productivity of the assets or cost to adapt them (Ping, 
1993). These investments would be lost if the alliance were dissolved, so they act as exit barriers. 
Their presence constitutes a source of dependence for the firm that makes them, which implies an 
adverse situation for managers who need to reduce the negative consequences of their firms’ 
vulnerable position. The presence of unilateral, alliance-specific investments triggers constructive 
response strategies and inhibits destructive ones (Hirschman, 1970; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010), 
because constructive responses reduce the risk of losing the investments if the relationship 
terminates prematurely. In the case of high alliance-specific investments, constructive responses 
may either be active, such as using creative or considerate voices to demonstrate commitment to 
the relationship, or passive, such as being patient to reduce the negative effect of the dependence. 
When alliance-specific investments are low though, managers have more latitude to act 
destructively, because their lesser dependence on their partner means they may exit the 
relationship, become more neglectful, or act opportunistically without fear of retaliation. The 
results of previous response strategy research support this logic (e.g., Ping, 1993). 
Finally, alternative availability refers to the extent to which the firm possesses attractive 
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alternatives outside the alliance that could enable it to attain its objectives (Ping, 1993). The 
presence of attractive alternatives provides firms with a source of power, whereas a dearth of 
alternatives increases dependence on counterparts. In an adverse situation without alternatives, 
managers have strong incentives to make the current alliance work and likely respond actively to 
improve the situation (Buchanan, 1992). For example, they might constructively use considerate 
and creative voice to ensure their partner collaboration, but because they do not depend on their 
partner, they also can use aggressive voice or opportunism if their partner is not cooperative. 
Moreover, if managers perceive that they have other alternatives for achieving their objectives, 
they depend less on the current relationship, which increases the likelihood of exit and passive 
strategies such as neglect and patience (Ping, 1993; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). 
Although in general empirical studies support the directions of the effects of the exchange 
variables on response strategy preference, the strength of the relationship varies across studies. 
By focusing solely on the effect of exchange variables, prior literature grounded in the investment 
model implicitly has assumed that with a specific combination of exchanges variables, every 
manager will prefer the same response strategies. For example, Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) in an 
experimental study in the Netherlands find that economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, 
alliance-specific investments, and the availability of attractive alternatives differentially and 
interactively affect response strategies. However, in their study, they neglect contextual variables, 
such as national culture, and their influence. In an international context, national culture likely 
influences managers’ preference for a response strategy (e.g., Lee and Jablin, 1992; Morris et al., 
1998; Radford et al., 1993), as well as their perception of the adversity of the situation; thus, it 
should moderate the effect of exchange variables (Thomas and Au, 2002; Thomas et al., 2003). 
We therefore develop hypotheses related to both the direct and moderating effects of national 
culture on response strategy preference. 
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3. Hypothesis development 
To understand international differences in response strategy preference, we turn to Hofstede 
(2001), who identifies four cultural dimensions: individualism–collectivism, masculinity–
femininity, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. We focus on these cultural dimensions to 
explain country differences (Taras, Rowney, and Steel, 2009) because they enable us to 
disentangle theoretically the direct and interaction effects of a country on response strategy 
preference (per Thomas and Pekerti, 2003). National culture and the country are not the same, yet 
country offers a good proxy for national culture (Hofstede, 2001). We hypothesize specifically 
that the individualism–collectivism and uncertainty avoidance cultural dimensions influence the 
active–passive (not constructive–destructive) dimension of response strategy preference and that 
the power distance and masculinity–femininity cultural dimensions influence the constructive–
destructive (not active–passive) dimension. In addition, we predict that the individualism–
collectivism and uncertainty avoidance cultural dimensions interact with two exchange variables, 
economic satisfaction and alternative availability, in affecting the same active–passive dimension 
of response strategies. Similarly, we hypothesize that the power distance and masculinity–
femininity cultural dimensions interact with social satisfaction and alliance-specific investments, 
because they affect the same constructive–destructive dimension of response strategies. 
Our hypotheses about the direct and moderating effects of national culture on response 
strategy preferences concern fundamental cultural processes, which pertain to interpersonal 
relationships. However, as we test them in an experimental ISA context, we frame them in such a 
context. Moreover, as we use business students acting as alliance managers rather than actual 
alliance managers to test these hypotheses, we refer to future managers when we present the 
specific relationships we test. 
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3.1. Individualism–collectivism 
The individualism–collectivism dimension refers to societal norms regarding individual–
group obligations and relationships. That is, individualism describes cultures in which the ties 
between individuals are loose (Hofstede, 2001). Thus within an alliance context, responsibility 
for action and responses to adverse situations lies within individual managers, who are more 
likely to be active, using different forms of voice or acting opportunistically. In collectivist 
cultures, the group is the dominant structure, and most actions reflect a consideration of their 
effect on the group and its members (Hofstede, 2001), so responsibility for action and response 
lies within the group. In collectivist cultures, decision-making processes and responses to 
adversity are guided by consensus (Thomas et al., 2003), which results in more passive responses 
(Yum, 2004). In such cultures, future managers likely prefer, more than those in individualistic 
countries, to exit the relationship or be neglectful or patient (Pressey and Qu, 2007). 
In countries with an individualistic culture, decision-making processes and responses to 
adverse situations reflect motives pertaining to the protection of individual profits, as justified by 
utilitarian principles (Thomas et al., 2003). Thus, if the relationship is perceived as valuable, 
future managers in individualist countries will prefer constructive strategies. However, when the 
relationship loses its value, they will act destructively. Compared with individualistic countries, 
people in countries with a collectivist culture are inclined to consider their business exchange 
partners as out-groups (Nakana, 1971), especially if they are foreigners (Johnson et al., 1996). 
Therefore, in an adverse situation, they will not hesitate to use destructive strategies to protect 
group harmony and save face. However, when responding constructively is in the best interest of 
the group, they will do so to maintain the status quo and limit actions that might disrupt in-group 
harmony (Triandis, 1995). Thus, in an alliance context, future managers in both individualistic 
and collectivistic countries should prefer constructive and destructive responses in similar ways. 
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However, because the individualism–collectivism dimension affects active–passive and not 
constructive–destructive response preferences, we hypothesize that within the context of alliances 
in individualist countries, active response strategies are relatively more preferred than passive 
response strategies, compared with collectivistic countries. 
Hypothesis 1a: In individualist countries, active response strategies (opportunism, aggressive, 
creative, and considerate voices) are preferred relatively more and passive strategies 
(patience, neglect, and exit) relatively less than in collectivistic countries.  
Also in relation to individualism–collectivism, economic satisfaction influences the degree of 
activeness and passiveness in response preference, such that these factors likely interact. 
Achieving economic satisfaction is a more important goal in individualistic countries than in 
collectivist countries, because alliances in the former are governed by more rational cost–benefit 
calculations (Triandis, 1995). Therefore, when economic satisfaction decreases, future managers 
in individualistic countries are more likely than their counterparts in collectivist countries to 
prefer active response strategies and less likely to prefer passive strategies to solve the situation 
(Thomas and Au, 2002). In contrast, future managers in collectivist countries are less sensitive to 
changes in economic satisfaction, as the quality of the relationship with their partner is more 
important than its short-term financial outcomes. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 1b: In individualistic countries, the negative effect of economic satisfaction on active 
response strategies and the positive effect of economic satisfaction on passive strategies are 
weaker than they are in collectivistic countries. 
Similar to the effect of economic satisfaction, the presence of attractive alternatives should 
influence the degree of activeness and passiveness of future managers’ response strategy 
preference, so we expect alternative attractiveness to interact with the individualism–collectivism 
cultural dimension. In individualistic countries, which better tolerate self-serving behaviors and 
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relationships based on cost–benefit calculations (Triandis, 1995), future managers without 
attractive alternatives feel threatened by the risk that their counterpart will prefer to exit the 
alliance; to reduce their dependence (Thomas and Au, 2002), they prefer active strategies more 
and passive strategies less than managers in collectivistic countries. Future managers from 
countries with collectivist cultures instead are used to depending on their group and therefore 
might feel less threatened by a dependence situation created by a lack of alternatives. Therefore, 
they are likely to be less influenced by the existence or absence of alternatives, because they do 
not consider the situation especially adverse. Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1c: In individualistic countries, the negative effect of alternative availability on 
active response strategies and the positive effect of alternative availability on passive 
strategies are stronger than they are in collectivistic countries. 
3.2. Masculinity–femininity 
The masculinity–femininity cultural dimension pertains to norms regarding an achievement 
motivation versus quality of life. Masculine cultures convey norms that emphasize the need for 
autonomous, competitive, and assertive actions to achieve materialistic goals (Hofstede, 2001; 
Hofstede and Usunier, 2003). In contrast, in countries with a feminine culture, the dominant 
norms emphasize collaboration, relationships, and caring for others (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede 
and Usunier, 2003). Masculine cultural norms favor ego-boosting behaviors and sympathy for the 
strong, which suggests a preference for destructive, less constructive behaviors. In such countries, 
conflicts get resolved through fighting, in an effort to “get things straight.” Thus, in an alliance 
context, future managers from masculine countries likely prefer more destructive response 
strategies compared with future managers from feminine countries. In contrast, feminine cultural 
norms exhibit a pattern of nurturance, which emphasizes less destructive and more constructive 
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behavior (Doney et al., 1998). Feminine cultural norms also emphasize modesty (Hofstede, 
2001), as reflected in a preference for compromises and less destructive response strategies, such 
as creative and considerate voices and patience (Doney et al., 1998; Hofstede and Usunier, 2003). 
However, the masculine–feminine cultural dimension does not influence the degree of 
activeness–passiveness of future managers’ response strategy preference. In masculine countries, 
destructive strategies are preferred over constructive ones, independent of their degree of 
activeness or passiveness. These countries value competition and assertive actions (Hofstede, 
2001; Hofstede and Usunier, 2003), so future managers are more likely to use aggressive voice, 
act opportunistically, exit the relationship, or act neglectfully than use constructive strategies, 
compared with those in feminine countries. In contrast, in feminine countries, in which the 
dominant norms emphasize collaboration and relationships (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and 
Usunier, 2003), future managers use constructive strategies, such as creative and considerate 
voices and patience, independent of the degree of activeness–passiveness, more so than 
destructive strategies, in comparison with those in masculine countries. Thus, we propose that the 
masculine–feminine cultural dimension affects the constructiveness–destructiveness of future 
managers’ response strategy preferences, not the activeness–passiveness of this preference. 
Hypothesis 2a: In masculine countries, destructive response strategies (neglect, exit, 
opportunism, and aggressive voice) are preferred relatively more and constructive strategies 
(creative and considerate voices, and patience) relatively less than in feminine countries. 
Because social satisfaction and the masculinity–femininity cultural dimension both influence 
the degree of constructiveness versus destructiveness, we posit that they interact. In masculine 
countries, social harmony and cooperative relationships are not goals in themselves, and fighting 
is a means to clarify a situation. Thus, future managers likely prefer destructive strategies over 
constructive strategies, compared with future managers in feminine cultures, irrespective of their 
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level of social satisfaction. In contrast, social harmony and good relationship quality are critically 
important in feminine countries, which tolerate socially dissatisfying relationships far less than 
do masculine cultures (Hofstede and Usunier, 2003). Therefore in feminine countries, social 
satisfaction should have a stronger effect on response strategy preference than it does in 
masculine cultures. As social satisfaction increases, future managers from feminine countries, 
who value consensus and close relationships (Hofstede, 2001), respond more constructively, 
whereas when social satisfaction decreases, they likely respond more destructively. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2b: In masculine countries, the positive effect of social satisfaction on constructive 
response strategies and the negative effect of social satisfaction on destructive strategies are 
weaker than they are in feminine countries. 
Similar to the effect of social satisfaction, the presence of alliance-specific investments 
should influence the degree of constructiveness–destructiveness of future managers’ response 
strategy preference, so we expect alliance-specific investments to interact with the masculinity–
femininity cultural dimension. As mentioned, feminine countries value close relationships 
(Hofstede, 2001), so future managers who have made alliance-specific investments do not 
perceive their dependence on their partner as a threat and are more likely than those from 
masculine countries to prefer constructive responses that protect the quality of their relationship, 
even if such behavior could increase their dependence. Therefore in feminine countries, future 
managers are more likely to prefer constructive responses and less likely to prefer destructive 
responses than in masculine cultures, irrespective of the amount of their alliance-specific 
investments. In contrast, when future managers from masculine countries perceive alliance-
specific investments as high, they likely feel threatened by their dependence on their counterpart, 
and to escape this dependence, they tend to prefer destructive response strategies, not 
constructive responses, relative to situations with low alliance-specific investments. Thus, we 
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hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2c: In masculine countries, the positive effect of alliance-specific investments on 
constructive response strategies and the negative effect of alliance-specific investments on 
destructive strategies are weaker than they are in feminine countries. 
3.3. Power distance 
Power distance pertains to norms for the acceptable distribution of power in a society, that is, 
the degree to which less powerful members within a society expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally (Hofstede, 2001). Inequality in small power distance countries is a 
necessary evil that should be minimized; in large power distance countries, inequality is the basis 
of societal order (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, in large power distance countries, the use of power 
through destructive strategies, such as exiting the relationship, opportunism, aggressive voice, or 
neglect, demands less legitimization than it would in small power distance countries. In small 
power distance countries though, the dominant cultural norm of harmony between the powerful 
and powerless favors constructive response strategies, such as creative and considerate voices and 
patience, because they are more likely to preserve the relationship between alliance partners. 
Because power distance relates to the distribution of power within a society, which can take 
both active and passive (i.e., potential power) forms, the power distance cultural dimension is not 
likely to influence the activeness or passiveness of future managers’ response strategy preference. 
Specifically, in large power distance countries, future managers may prefer both active and 
passive destructive response strategies over constructive ones, often by legitimizing neglect and 
aggressive voice. In small power distance countries, patience and considerate and constructive 
voices are all constructive strategies, whether active or passive, that can protect harmony. Thus, 
the power distance cultural dimension likely affects the constructiveness–destructiveness of 
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response strategy preference but not the active–passive dimension: 
Hypothesis 3a: In high power distance countries, destructive response strategies (neglect, exit, 
opportunism, and aggressive voice) are preferred relatively more and constructive strategies 
(creative and considerate voices, and patience) relatively less than in low power distance 
countries. 
Because both social satisfaction and the power distance cultural dimension influence the 
degree of constructiveness versus destructiveness of the response strategy preference, we posit 
that they interact. As in masculine countries, in large power distance countries, social harmony 
and cooperative relationships are not goals in themselves. Future managers in such countries 
therefore are more likely to prefer destructive strategies and less likely to prefer constructive 
strategies compared with future managers in small power distance countries, regardless of their 
level of social satisfaction. In contrast, social harmony and good relationship quality are critically 
important in small power distance countries, which tolerate socially dissatisfying relationships far 
less than do large power distance countries (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore in small power distance 
countries, social satisfaction should have a stronger effect on response strategy preference than in 
large power distance cultures. As social satisfaction increases, future managers from small power 
distance countries likely respond more constructively, whereas when social satisfaction 
decreases, they are likely to respond more destructively. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3b: In high power distance countries, the positive effect of social satisfaction on 
constructive response strategies and the negative effect of social satisfaction on destructive 
strategies are weaker than in low power distance countries. 
Similar to the effect of social satisfaction, the presence of alliance-specific investments can 
influence the degree of constructiveness and destructiveness of future managers’ response 
strategy preference, so we expect alliance-specific investments to interact with the power distance 
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cultural dimension. Power distance deals with the need for dependence versus interdependence in 
society (Hofstede, 2001). In high power distance countries, people strive for independence; in 
small power distance countries, they likely accept interdependence with partners. Therefore, 
when the amount of alliance-specific investments increases, future managers in large power 
distance countries are likely to react more constructively and less destructively to reduce the risks 
related to their dependence. On the contrary, in countries with small power distance, when the 
amount of alliance-specific investments increases, future managers do not feel more threatened, 
nor do they respond differently than they would in situations with low levels of alliance-specific 
investments. 
Hypothesis 3c: In high power distance countries, the positive effect of alliance-specific 
investments on constructive response strategies and the negative effect of alliance-specific 
investments on destructive strategies are weaker than in low power distance countries. 
3.4. Uncertainty avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance pertains to the degree to which the members of a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity (Hofstede, 2001). In an alliance context, future 
managers in high uncertainty countries seek to reduce uncertainty by engaging in passive 
response strategies, rather than active ones, to reduce the risk of harmful partner retaliatory 
behavior. Passive response strategies, such as patience and neglect, or even exit, are perceived as 
less uncertain than more active ones, such as different types of voice and opportunism. In 
contrast, we expect that future managers from higher uncertainty countries prefer more active 
response strategies, which may result in more uncertain outcomes. In countries with low 
uncertainty avoidance, people are more willing to accept uncertainty and not afraid to take risks. 
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Uncertainty avoidance is less likely to influence the degree of constructiveness–
destructiveness of future managers’ response strategy preference, because active strategies seem 
more uncertain, irrespective of their constructiveness or destructiveness. For example, 
opportunism may trigger retaliatory behavior, but creative voice is also ambiguous, because it 
challenges the status quo. In contrast, constructive and destructive passive strategies appear less 
risky, because they allow for more time and their effects emerge only in the longer term. 
Therefore, the degree of constructiveness–destructiveness is not likely to be influenced by the 
uncertainty avoidance cultural dimension. We postulate that uncertainty avoidance instead affects 
the activeness–passiveness of future managers’ response strategy preferences. 
Hypothesis 4a: In countries with high uncertainty avoidance, active response strategies 
(opportunism, aggressive, creative, and considerate voices) are preferred relatively less and 
passive strategies (patience, neglect, and exit) relatively more than in countries with low 
uncertainty avoidance. 
Economic satisfaction also influences the degree of activeness and passiveness in response 
preference, so these two factors should interact. Achieving short-term economic performance is a 
more important goal in high uncertainty avoidance countries than in low uncertainty avoidance 
countries. Therefore, when economic satisfaction is low, future managers in high uncertainty 
avoidance cultures are more likely than those in low uncertainty avoidance countries to prefer 
active and less likely to prefer passive response strategies to reduce the ambiguity created by low 
economic performance. In contrast, future managers in low uncertainty avoidance countries are 
less sensitive to changes in economic satisfaction, because they are less afraid of uncertainties 
and ambiguities, such that they may trade off short-term performance losses for long-term 
benefits. 
Hypothesis 4b: In high uncertainty avoidance countries, the negative effect of economic 
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satisfaction on active response strategies and the positive effect of economic satisfaction on 
passive strategies are stronger than in low uncertainty avoidance countries. 
Finally, and similar to the effect of economic satisfaction, the presence of attractive 
alternatives should influence the degree of activeness and passiveness of future managers’ 
response strategy preference and interact with the uncertainty avoidance cultural dimension. In 
high uncertainty avoidance countries, future managers without attractive alternatives feel 
threatened that their counterpart will prefer to exit the alliance, so to reduce the ambiguity and 
uncertainty related to their dependence, they prefer active strategies more and passive strategies 
less, compared with future managers from low uncertainty avoidance countries. In contrast, those 
from low uncertainty countries are less threatened by the uncertainties of a dependence situation 
created by a lack of alternatives. They are then less influenced by the availability of attractive 
alternatives, and we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4c: In high uncertainty avoidance countries, the negative effect of alternative 
availability on active response strategies and the positive effect of alternative availability on 
passive strategies are stronger than in low uncertainty avoidance countries. 
4. Methodology 
To test the hypotheses empirically, we designed a scenario-based experiment, a method that 
has proven useful for studying response strategies (Lee and Jablin, 1992; Rusbult et al., 1988; 
Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010) and international management decisions (Joardar et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, with an experiment, we can examine causal relationships between predictors and 
outcomes in controlled conditions (i.e., reduce impact of confounding effects), which makes this 
method particularly suitable for disentangling direct and moderating effects (Bateman and 
Zeithaml 1989; Croson et al., 2007). 
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4.1. Sample 
To assess the effects of national culture differences on response strategies, we collected data 
in five countries: Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland (French-speaking part), Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom. These five countries systematically vary according to the four cultural 
dimensions of Hofstede, ranging from 37 to 89 for individualism, from 14 to 95 form 
masculinity, from 35 to 70 for power distance and from 35 to 92 for uncertainty avoidance (see 
Table 1). We focus on Hofstede’s dimensions rather than others, given evidence that it has had 
far greater impact (Kirkman et al, 2006). In addition, even if Hofstede’s scores have been 
criticized for being outdated and collected in a specific context, recent meta-analysis (Taras et al., 
in press) and data (Ralston et al., in press) show that if country scores tend to converge over time, 
the relative position of our five countries is relatively stable. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We collected 1,379 questionnaires from business students enrolled in masters’ programs 
(M.Sc.) in Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Only students 
born and raised in their country were retained in the final samples. The Dutch sample consisted of 
334 students, with an average age of 24.4 years, 35.5% of whom were women. The Swiss sample 
consisted of 255 business students with an average age of 23.3 years, 42.4% of whom were 
women. The Turkish sample consisted of 278 students, with an average age of 23.3 years, 49.6% 
of whom were women. The Japanese sample consisted of 262 respondents with an average age of 
24.4 years, 32.1% of whom were women. The U.K. sample consisted of 250 students with an 
average age of 23.7 years, and 46% of them were woman. 
As our hypotheses are not specific to ISAs but to more general interpersonal relationships 
and pertain to relative stable characteristics of human nature (Bello et al., 2009), two arguments 
support our decision to use business students, as respondents. First, the use of a homogeneous 
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sample of business students allows us to improve internal validity (Croson et al., 2007). Second, 
compared to actual managers, whose responses may be contaminated by past experience with a 
specific existing alliance (framing bias), business students are more likely to only respond to the 
manipulations (Bateman and Zeithaml 1989). In addition, as they represent future managers, they 
are likely to understand the strategic alliance context of the experiment. 
As already mentioned the use of business students may raise the issue of external validity, 
therefore to assess the validity of our results, we collected additional survey data from a sample 
of 135 Dutch alliance managers (average age = 42.6 years [SD = 9.0]; average alliance 
management experience = 4.1 [SD = 1.8] on seven-point experience scale; 69.6% men), and 
compared their results with those of the Dutch business students. This comparison allows us to 
test the validity of our measurement and manipulations. 
The questionnaire, originally developed in English, was translated into Japanese and Turkish, 
following standard translation and back-translation procedures. Students in the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom used the English version of the questionnaire, because 
English was the language used in their study programs. 
4.2. Scenario-based experiment 
To capture adverse situations, we manipulated economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, 
alliance-specific investments, and the availability of alternatives (per Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). 
The experiment in each country used a four-factor (exchange variables) by two level (positive 
versus negative) between-subjects design, in which we combined the manipulations to form 16 
different scenarios, though we removed the all-positive (i.e., not adverse) scenario. Each 
experiment was conducted over multiple sessions, in which we assigned each participant 
randomly to one of the 15 scenarios. The participants assumed the roles of alliance managers and 
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indicated how they would respond to the adverse situation presented in the scenario. The text of 
the scenarios appears in the Appendix. 
To manipulate economic satisfaction, we varied the financial outcomes of the alliance, such 
that it produced either beyond or below their expectations. The social satisfaction manipulation 
centered on relationship quality. The quality of the relationship referred to the extent to which the 
firms developed a relationship characterized by trust, commitment, and adaptability, which 
eliminated the need for substantial monitoring costs. For the alliance-specific investment 
manipulation, we varied the extent to which the focal firm made substantial investments in the 
alliance and could expect switching costs. Specifically, the focal firm either invested little or 
substantially and could or could not expect additional costs from penalty fees if the alliance 
ended prematurely. Finally, we manipulated the availability of alternatives as the extent to which 
the focal firm had other means to realize its objectives, whether many or only a few available 
alliance partners. 
4.3. Response strategy measures 
To operationalize the seven response strategies, we turned to existing scales and, when 
necessary, adapted them to the context of ISA. We measured exit with items pertaining to 
whether the respondent intended to end the relationship or stop doing business with the partner 
(Rusbult et al., 1982; Withey and Cooper, 1989). The measures for opportunism, adapted from 
Ping (1993) and Wathne and Heide (2000), included withholding information, exaggerating the 
adverse nature of the situation, and escaping from contractual obligations. Aggressive voice items 
referred to pushing a solution forcefully or being persistent (Hibbard et al., 2001). For creative 
voice, we used items related to the creation of innovative and creative solutions or fresh ideas 
(Zhou and George, 2001). To measure considerate voice, the items indicated working to create a 
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consensus and finding a solution satisfactory and acceptable for everyone (Ping, 1993). We 
operationalized patience with items such as optimistically waiting for better times and trusting 
that the situation would resolve itself (Hibbard et al., 2001; Ping, 1993). For neglect, the items 
referred to not dealing with the issue, not putting additional effort into the relationship, and not 
presenting initiatives to improve the situation (Ping, 1993). All these measures used seven-point 
Likert scales, ranging from “I would definitely not react in this way” [1] to “I would definitely 
react in this way” [7]. The list of items appears in Table 2. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.4. Control variables 
To take into account the potential effect of noncultural factors, we also measured several 
control variables: A single-item scale assessed perceptions of the severity of the situation, which 
can influence the choice of response strategies (Rusbult et al., 1988). In addition, because some 
response strategies may be more socially desirable (considerate voice) than others (opportunism), 
we included the M-C2 version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (Strahan and 
Gerbasi, 1972). Finally, we measured the respondents’ age and gender, because these personal 
characteristics may influence preferences for response strategies (e.g., Rusbult et al., 1988). 
5. Analyses and results 
We conducted four sets of analyses to examine the data. First, we assessed the reliability and 
construct validity of the response strategy measures using Cronbach’s alpha and the composite 
reliability (CR) coefficients, as well as the factor loadings from confirmatory factor analyses 
(CFAs) conducted in each country separately. Second, we ran a series of multigroup CFAs to 
assess the degree to which the seven-factor model is invariant across the four countries. Third, to 
examine the direct and moderating effects of country differences and test the hypotheses, we 
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conducted a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), followed by a series of post-hoc 
country comparisons and F-tests. Because the response strategies were interrelated, we 
manipulated the scenario variables, and we used covariates to control for confounding effects, a 
MANCOVA was the most appropriate method (Huberty and Morris, 1989). Fourth, to examine 
the external validity of the findings, we collected additional data from alliance managers in the 
Netherlands and assessed the measurement equivalence and similarity of their responses with 
those from the business students in our Dutch sample. 
5.1. Construct validity and cross-cultural invariance of the response strategies 
We conducted a separate CFA for each country to test the proposed seven-factor response 
strategy structure. The alphas and CR greater than or equal to .70, along with factor loadings that 
exceed .50, suggest acceptable reliability and convergent validity (Nunnally and Bernstein, 
1994). We tested seven-factor models rather than the seven dimensions separately so that we 
could investigate the discriminant validity of the seven response strategies simultaneously 
(Perrinjaquet et al., 2007). We employed maximum likelihood estimation procedures, because the 
data do not strongly violate multivariate normality assumptions (McDonald and Ho, 2002). 
Following common practice (e.g., Byrne, 2001; Hu and Bentler, 1999), we also used multiple 
indicators to assess model fit, namely, the normed chi-square (χ
2
/d.f.), root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), non-normed fit index 
(NNFI), and comparative fit index (CFI), and we required RMSEA ≤ .06, SRMR ≤ .08, NNFI ≥ 
.90, and CFI ≥ .95, as well as χ
2
/d.f. less than or equal to 2, to confirm good model fit. 
We used AMOS 17.0 to estimate a seven-factor CFA model with the 21 response strategy 
items for each country. The analyses reveal no offending estimates in any of the models. The 
country models possess good fit (see Table 3); the normed chi-square values are 1.53, 1.50, 1.54, 
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1.98, and 1.57, for Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom 
respectively. In addition, other goodness-of-fit indices suggest acceptable fit: The RMSEA values 
range from .031 [90% confidence interval (CI): .013, .044] for the United Kingdom to .059 [90% 
CI: .050, .069] for Turkey, below the cut-off value. The other indices also suggest a good fit; for 
Japan, the fit indices are .058 (SRMR), .95 (NNFI), and .96 (CFI); for the Netherlands, these 
values are .049 (SRMR), .96 (NNFI), and .97 (CFI); for Switzerland, they are .052 (SRMR), .95 
(NNFI), and .96 (CFI); for Turkey, .059 (SRMR), .90 (NNFI), and .92 (CFI); and for the United 
Kingdom, they are .046 (SRMR), .95 (NNFI), and .96 (CFI). The Turkish CFI is thus slightly 
below the expected value but sufficient. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
To assess convergent validity, we examined the factor loadings, which are significant and 
exceed the .50 threshold, ranging from .53 to .85 in the Japanese sample, .56 to .90 in the Dutch 
sample, .51 to .89 in the Swiss sample, .55 to .88 in the Turkish sample, and .56 to .90 in the 
British sample, with one exception. The Cronbach’s alphas and CR values are greater than .70, 
with a few exceptions that are still above .60 (see Table 4). The average variances extracted are 
slightly below their expected values (.34–.73), but the square roots range from .58 to .85, higher 
than any of their respective pairwise correlations, indicating discriminant validity. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We then tested for measurement and construct invariance to determine whether the response 
strategies remain invariant across countries. Measurement invariance pertains to the psychometric 
properties of the measurement scales and includes configural invariance, metric invariance, and 
scalar invariance. Scalar invariance is a prerequisite for interpreting construct differences 
(Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). However, full scalar invariance is not necessary, provided 
at least one item per response strategy is invariant (i.e., partial invariance) (Byrne, 2001). To 
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evaluate measurement and construct invariance, we used multigroup CFA models and considered 
group comparisons across the five countries. Full scalar invariance is not achieved, but after 
releasing four factor loadings and nine intercept constraints, we establish partial scalar invariance 
with satisfactory fit indices: The normed chi-square value is 1.53, RMSEA is .020 [90% CI: .018, 
.022], SRMR is .049, NNFI is .94, and CFI is .95. The comparative fit indices between an 
unconstrained model and the partial invariant model are not significantly different (∆χ
2
 = 44.5, 
p = .11, ∆CFI = .001), in support of partial scalar invariance. These results enable us to conduct 
mean comparisons across countries to test the hypotheses. 
5.2. Impact of cultural differences on response strategy preference 
To test the effect of country on response strategies, we conducted a MANCOVA. We ran 
post-hoc group comparisons and F-tests to test the hypotheses and interpret the effects of country 
differences on response strategies, as well as the impact of the exchange variables. For our 
analyses, we used the average scores for each response strategy as dependent variables and the 
scenario manipulations and country as the fixed factors, with gender, age, problem severity, and 
social desirability as covariates. Prior to the analysis, we examined the MANCOVA assumptions 
and found no violations. 
The omnibus MANCOVA tests indicate significant differences for the exchange variables 
and countries. Specifically, we find significant Wilks’ lambdas for country (Λ = .77, F = 12.96, p 
< .001) and the four exchange variables: economic satisfaction (Λ = .96, F = 7.93, p < .001), 
social satisfaction (Λ = .93, F = 13.76, p < .001), alliance-specific investments (Λ = .99, F = 2.65, 
p < .01), and alternative availability (Λ = .92, F = 16.80, p < .001). Of the four hypothesized two-
way interactions between country and exchange variables, three are significant: with economic 
satisfaction (Λ = .96, F = 2.20, p < .001), social satisfaction (Λ = .96, F = 1.81, p < .01), and 
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alternative availability (Λ = .96, F = 2.06, p < .01). The interaction between country and alliance-
specific investment is not significant. Furthermore, three of the four control variables are 
significant: age (Λ = .99, F = 2.13, p < .05), problem severity (Λ = .98, F = 3.17, p < .01), and 
social desirability (Λ = .97, F = 5.69, p < .05). Gender is not significant (Λ = .99, F = .70, p = 
.67). The F-values of the corrected model, which reflect variations in the response strategies 
attributable to country, exchange variables, and covariates, show significant results for all seven 
response strategies (see Table 5). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
To test the hypotheses, we conducted post-hoc F-tests. With regard to the direct effect of 
country, the univariate F-tests show significant differences for all seven strategies (see Table 5): 
exit (F = 22.53, p < .001), opportunism (F = 20.27, p < .001), aggressive voice (F = 15.79, p < 
.001), creative voice (F = 11.96, p < .01), considerate voice (F = 8.74, p < .001), patience (F = 
11.09, p < .001), and neglect (F = 9.04, p < .001). 
Hypothesis 1a proposes that in individualist countries, active response strategies are 
preferred relatively more and passive strategies relatively less than in collectivistic countries. The 
results of the pairwise comparisons in Table 5 suggest that the hypothesis is fully supported for 
creative and considerate voices, patience, and neglect. Overall, respondents in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—the more individualist countries—are more likely 
to use creative and considerate voices and less likely to use patience and neglect than respondents 
in Japan and Turkey, the more collectivist countries. Hypothesis 1a is also partially supported for 
opportunism (except for Japan) and aggressive voice (except for Switzerland), but it is not 
supported for exit. Overall then, we find support for Hypothesis 1a. 
Hypothesis 2a proposes that in masculine countries, destructive response strategies are 
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preferred relatively more and constructive strategies relatively less than in feminine countries. 
The results of the pairwise comparisons suggest support for the hypothesis for exit and creative 
and considerate voice in the case of Japan, the most masculine country in our sample, and for 
considerate voice and neglect in the case of the Netherlands, the most feminine country. For the 
United Kingdom, the second most masculine country in our sample, we find some support for the 
hypothesis in relation to exit, opportunism, aggressive voice, patience, and neglect. The results 
are also consistent with our expectations for Switzerland, which scores in the middle in terms of 
masculinity. However, the results for Turkey conflict with our expectations. Overall, Hypothesis 
2a receives support. 
Hypothesis 3a proposes that in large power distance countries, destructive response strategies 
are preferred relatively more and constructive strategies relatively less than in small power 
distance countries. The results of the pairwise comparisons confirm the hypothesis for 
opportunism, considerate voice, and neglect in the case of Turkey, a country with a large power 
distance. The hypothesis is also supported for creative and considerate voice in the case of the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the two countries with the smallest power distance in our 
sample. For creative and considerate voices, the results for Switzerland are contrary to our 
expectations, in that respondents in this country scored relatively high. Overall, we uncover 
partial support for Hypothesis 3a. 
Hypothesis 4a proposes that in countries with high uncertainty avoidance, active response 
strategies are preferred relatively less and passive strategies relatively more than in countries with 
low uncertainty avoidance. The results of the pairwise comparisons suggest that the hypothesis is 
fully supported for aggressive, creative, and considerate voices, patience, and neglect. Overall, 
respondents in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the countries with the smallest 
uncertainty avoidance, are more likely to use aggressive, creative, and considerate voices and less 
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likely to use patience and neglect than are respondents in Japan, Turkey, and Switzerland, the 
countries with the largest uncertainty avoidance. Hypothesis 4a is also partially supported for 
opportunism (except for Japan and Turkey). Overall, we find support for Hypothesis 4a. 
Consistent with our expectations and across countries, the exchange variables influence 
response strategy preference. Economic satisfaction has a direct negative effect on exit (F = 
36.82, p < .001) and a positive effect on patience (F = 10.53, p < .001). Social satisfaction has 
direct negative effects on exit (F = 67.20, p < .001), opportunism (F = 5.71, p < .05), and 
aggressive voice (F = 8.07, p < .01) and positive effects on considerate voice (F = 10.01, p < .01) 
and patience (F = 11.93, p < .001). Alliance-specific investments have direct negative effects on 
exit (F = 5.84, p < .05) and aggressive voice (F = 3.83, p < .05) and a positive effect on 
considerate voice (F = 11.78, p < .001). The lack of attractive alternatives, across countries, has a 
direct negative effect on exit (F = 92.31, p < .001) and neglect (F = 8.77, p < .01) and a positive 
effect on creative voice (F = 32.11, p < .001), considerate voice (F = 60.77, p < .001), and 
patience (F = 8.77, p < .01). 
The interaction effects between the country and economic satisfaction are statistically 
significant for considerate voice (F = 4.03, p < .01) and patience (F = 3.88, p < .01) but not for 
the other response strategies. We provide the interaction plot for considerate voice in Figure 1a 
and that for patience on Figure 1b. For these two response strategies, the results provide support 
for Hypothesis 1b, except for Switzerland. In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, two 
individualistic countries, the positive effects of economic satisfaction on considerate voice and its 
negative effects on patience are stronger than they are for Turkey and Japan, the two most 
collectivist countries in our sample. The results also support Hypothesis 4b; for Japan and 
Turkey, two countries with high uncertainty avoidance, the positive effects of economic 
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satisfaction on considerate voice and its negative effects satisfaction on patience are stronger than 
for the low uncertainty avoidance countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
The interaction effects between country and social satisfaction are statistically significant for 
exit (F = 3.62, p < .01) and opportunism (F = 2.47, p < .01) and not significant for the other 
response strategies. The interaction plot for exit appears in Figure 1c; that for opportunism is in 
Figure 1d. The results provide partial support for Hypothesis 2b, because the more feminine 
Netherlands indicates a stronger negative effect of social satisfaction on exit than Turkey, with its 
medium level of masculinity, and the United Kingdom, with its very masculine culture. However, 
the significant effect of social satisfaction in Japan, a masculine culture, on exit contrasts with our 
expectations. In addition, for opportunism, social satisfaction has the strongest effect in the 
Netherlands compared with the more masculine countries, in line with our expectations. 
However, contrary to our expectations, the effects of social satisfaction in Turkey and 
Switzerland are weaker than they are in Japan and the United Kingdom. The results also provide 
partial support for Hypothesis 3b: For Japan, Turkey, and Switzerland, the three countries with 
the largest power distances in our sample, the negative effect of social satisfaction on exit is 
stronger than it is for the United Kingdom, the country with smallest power distance, but it is not 
stronger than that for the Netherlands. 
The interaction effects between country and alternative availability are statistically 
significant for exit (F = 4.71, p < .001), considerate voice (F = 2.46, p < .05), patience (F = 2.91, 
p < .05), and neglect (F = 2.40, p < .05) but not for the other response strategies. We provide the 
interaction plot for exit in Figure 1e and that for considerate voice in Figure 1f, with the plots for 
patience in Figure 1g and for neglect in Figure 1h. For these four response strategies, the results 
support Hypothesis 1c. In the Netherlands and Switzerland, two individualistic countries, the 
negative effect of alternative availability on considerate voice and its positive effect on exit are 
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stronger than those for Turkey, the most collectivist country in our sample. In addition, the 
positive effects of alternative availability on patience and neglect are stronger for the United 
Kingdom, the most individualist country in our sample, than for Turkey. The results also provide 
support for Hypothesis 4c by showing that for Japan, the country with the highest uncertainty 
avoidance, the negative effect of alternative availability on considerate voice and its positive 
effects on exit, patience, and neglect are stronger than the United Kingdom, the country with 
lowest uncertainty avoidance.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Among the control variables, age, problem severity, and social desirability have significant 
effects on response strategy preference. Age has significant effects on creative voice (F = 4.07, p 
< .05) and considerate voice (F = 5.67, p < .05); the post-hoc tests reveal that older respondents 
are more likely to use creative and considerate voices than are younger ones. Problem severity 
influences exit (F = 3.87, p < .05) and patience (F = 10.80, p < .001); the more severe the 
perception of the situation, the more likely respondents are to exit and the less likely they are to 
be patient. Social desirability has a significant effect on preferences for several response 
strategies: opportunism (F = 24.87, p < .001), creative voice (F = 8.06, p < .01), considerate 
voice (F = 16.33, p < .001), and neglect (F = 3.85, p < .05). Respondents with high scores on the 
social desirability scale are less likely to act opportunistically and neglectfully and more likely to 
choose creative and considerate voices than are respondents with low social desirability scores. 
The effect of gender is not significant though. 
5.3. External validity test 
To assess the external validity of our measurement scales and scenario manipulations, we 
compared the results of the Dutch managers and business students in two steps. First, we used 
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multigroup CFA to test measurement invariance across the two groups. The results exhibit full 
metric and partial scalar invariance (four intercepts released) with satisfactory fit indices: The 
normed chi-square value is 1.54, RMSEA is .034 [90% CI: .028, .039], SRMR is .077, NNFI is 
.94, and CFI is .95. The comparative fit indices between the unconstrained model and the partial 
scalar equivalent model are not statistically significant (∆χ
2
 = 17.0, p = .11, ∆CFI = .002), in 
support of partial scalar measurement invariance between the future and actual manager samples.  
Second, we ran a MANCOVA with the seven response strategies as dependent variables; the 
four exchange variables as fixed factors; a fixed factor sample to denote future and actual 
managers; and age, gender, problem severity, and social desirability as covariates. We also 
included two-way interactions in the model. If the sample and sample–exchange variable 
interactions are not significant, we can confirm the external validity of the business student 
sample, because no difference in response strategy preferences would exist between the future 
and actual manager samples. Consistent with our expectations, the omnibus MANCOVA tests 
indicate significant differences for the four exchange variables, but not for the sample factor. 
Specifically, we find significant Wilks’ lambdas for economic satisfaction (Λ = .95, F = 3.27, p < 
.01), social satisfaction (Λ = .89, F = 7.71, p < .001), alliance-specific investments (Λ = .97, F = 
2.29, p < .05), and alternative availability (Λ = .96, F = 2.80, p < .01) but not for the sample 
factor (Λ = .99, F = .70, p = .68). The four interactions between the sample factor and the 
exchange variables are not significant at 5%; the only significant two-way interaction is between 
the sample factor and problem severity (Λ = .97, F = 2.29, p < .05) for two response strategies: 
patience (F = 5.84, p < .05) and neglect (F = 11.35, p < .001). That is, actual managers are more 
patient and neglectful than future managers when problem severity increases. Overall, these 
results provide support for the external validity of our measures and experimental design. 
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6. Discussion 
This study investigates cross-country differences in preferences for using seven response 
strategies in international strategic alliances. A scenario-based experiment among 1,379 students 
acting as alliance managers from five countries—Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom—demonstrates that country directly influences the preference for 
response strategies and moderates the effects of economic and social satisfaction and the 
availability of alternatives. 
6.1. Interpretation of main results 
Respondents in Japan, a country characterized by high scores on masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance and medium scores on individualism and power distance, are more likely to use exit 
and patience; less likely to use opportunism, creative voice, and considerate voice; and indifferent 
toward aggressive voice and neglect compared with respondents from other countries. This 
summary indicates that for Japanese respondents, preferences for destructive response strategies 
and the rejection of constructive response strategies likely reflects a high level of masculinity 
and, to some extent, a medium level of power distance. Although the results for the passive 
responses cannot be explained by the direct effects of the cultural dimensions, the country 
interactions with economic satisfaction and alternative availability suggest that sensitivity to 
these exchange variables, due to high uncertainty avoidance, affects response strategy 
preferences. Similarly, high masculinity makes Japanese respondents less sensitive to social 
satisfaction, which explains their low preference for opportunism. 
Respondents in the Netherlands, a country characterized by high individualism, medium to 
low scores on uncertainty avoidance, and low scores on masculinity and power distance, are more 
likely to use considerate and creative voices and less likely to use patience and neglect. They are 
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indifferent toward exit, opportunism, and aggressive voice. The preference for active–
constructive responses and rejection of passive–destructive responses may be attributed to the 
effect of high individualism and low power distance and masculinity. The low preference for 
passive–destructive responses also implies that the effect of individualism is stronger than the 
effect of power distance and masculinity on their response strategies.  
Compared with respondents from the other countries, those in Switzerland, a country 
characterized by high power distance, medium to high scores on individualism and uncertainty 
avoidance, and medium scores on masculinity, are less likely to prefer exit, aggressive voice, and 
patience but are indifferent toward opportunism, creative and considerate voices, and neglect. 
The medium to high levels of individualism and uncertainty avoidance explain the low preference 
for passive response strategies. However, the high level of power distance does not seem to 
influence response strategy preference. The Swiss respondents revealed the lowest scores on 
aggressive voice, which cannot be explained by the moderating effect of national culture. 
We find that respondents in Turkey, a country characterized by high scores on uncertainty 
avoidance and power distance, medium scores on masculinity, and low scores on individualism, 
are more likely to use patience, neglect, and opportunism; less likely to use exit and creative and 
considerate voices; and indifferent toward aggressive voice, compared with respondents from the 
other countries. The preference for passive response and low preference for active strategies 
stems from the low level of individualism. Although the high level of uncertainty avoidance 
seems not to influence response strategy preference, the preference for destructive response 
strategies is affected by a high score on power distance and medium score on masculinity. The 
exit results cannot be explained by the direct of effect of cultural dimensions, but the relatively 
low preference for exit, compared with that in other countries, may be explained by Turkish 
respondents’ lower sensitivity to social satisfaction and alternative availability. 
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Finally, respondents in the United Kingdom, a country characterized by high scores on 
individualism and masculinity and low scores on power distance and uncertainty avoidance, are 
more likely to prefer exit and aggressive, creative, and considerate voices; less likely to use 
patience and neglect; and indifferent toward opportunism. High individualism leads to a 
preference for active but not for passive responses, whereas high masculinity results in a 
preference for destructive responses.  
Taken together, these results indicate that the four cultural dimensions, both directly and 
interactively with exchange variables, affect the degree of activeness–passiveness and 
constructiveness–destructiveness of response strategy preference. Specifically, individualism–
collectivism and uncertainty avoidance influence the degree of activeness–passiveness and 
moderate the effect of economic satisfaction and alternative availability. In addition, masculinity–
femininity and power distance influence the degree of constructiveness–destructiveness and 
moderate the effect of social satisfaction. The interaction between country and alliance-specific 
investments is not significant. One explanation for this finding is that managers across cultures 
perceive such investments as equally critical for relationship development, such that the 
criticality of these investments overrides cultural differences. 
6.2. Theoretical and managerial implications 
Our study was conducted in an experimental setting with business students, however, 
because the cultural effects we tested pertain to basic characteristics of human nature, we believe 
that our results have some theoretical and managerial implications that are broader than the 
narrow context in which they were tested. 
Drawing on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and interdependence theory (Thibaut and 
Kelley, 1959), response strategy research has proposed an investment model (e.g., Geyskens and 
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Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993; Rusbult and Zembrodt, 1983) in which satisfaction with exchange 
outcomes, specific investments, and the availability of alternatives drive preferences for response 
strategies. In an international context, this model also should incorporate cross-cultural 
differences, because people from different countries prefer different responses when confronted 
with similar adverse situations. The results of our study contribute to response strategy literature 
by demonstrating that preferences for response strategies vary across cultures. 
Extant ISA studies demonstrate that cultural differences affect relationship development, 
because they tend to exacerbate adverse situations (e.g., Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; 
Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006). We improve understanding of this issue by shifting attention 
from the overall effect of cultural differences to the underlying direct and moderating 
mechanisms through which national cultures influence managers’ decision making (Boyacigiller 
and Adler, 1991). Just as people from different countries generally prefer different response 
strategies, their reactions depend on different types of adversity, which corroborates the findings 
of Thomas and Au (2002) and Thomas and Pekerti (2003). When faced with the same adverse 
situation, our future managers respondents from different countries likely prefer different 
response strategies, depending on the strategies they believe will be most adequate in their 
cultural environment. This point is critical for the management of ISAs, because managers with a 
better understanding of the behavioral intentions of their foreign partners, as well as their own 
preferences, can better overcome adverse situations. 
Prior studies (e.g., Brouthers and Bamossy, 2006; Meschi, 1997) also suggest that learning 
about cultural differences can reduce the negative effect of adverse situations. By disentangling 
the direct and moderating mechanisms through which national culture influences reactions to 
adverse situations, our study provide managers with a better understanding of how to deal with 
adverse situations in ISAs more effectively and thus should help them reduce the likelihood of 
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failure. An alliance manager from an individualistic country who understands that social 
satisfaction may be more important than economic satisfaction for his or her counterpart from a 
collectivist country will be better equipped to deal with the adverse situation and preserve the 
alliance. Alliance managers who are able to predict which response strategies their foreign 
counterparts prefer should be able to develop a collaborative relationship more easily and avoid 
detrimental conflicts. 
6.3. Limitations and further research directions 
Although we believe our results offer important contributions to the international strategic 
alliance literature and practice, our study is limited in several respects. First, we collected data in 
only five countries; further studies should collect data from a wider variety of countries to further 
disentangle the direct and moderating effects of national culture more clearly. Second, we 
focused on the effect of national culture on response strategy preference, without measuring 
cultural values directly; instead we used Hofstede’s scores to classify countries along the four 
cultural dimensions. As these scores are not without critics and pertain to country level only, 
measuring cultural values at the individual level would be necessary to understand both inter- and 
intracountry differences. Third, by not measuring cultural values, we have been limited to testing 
country differences rather than cultural differences. Therefore, our results should be interpreted 
with caution, because other contextual variables, such as country wealth and level of 
development, may have affected the results. Fourth, we conducted a scenario-based experiment 
and measured behavioral intentions, which is appropriate for determining the direct and indirect 
effects of national culture on response strategy preference. However, behavioral intentions do not 
always translate into behavior. Fifth, the use of an experimental design with business students as 
respondents increases the internal validity of the results but also may raise questions about 
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external validity. Although a comparison of the results of the Dutch student sample with those of 
a survey of Dutch alliance managers indicates satisfactory level of convergence, our results about 
the direct and moderating effects of culture might only be generalizable to a population of future 
managers rather than actual managers. Therefore, further studies should conduct survey research 
to validate the results with managers across countries. Studying managers’ work experience also 
might be relevant, because our results indicate that age, which we use as a proxy for experience, 
has a significant effect on two response strategies (i.e., creative and considerate voices). 
7. Conclusion 
In the context of response strategies, our results indicate that country differences directly 
affect preferences for the activeness–passiveness and constructiveness–destructiveness of 
responses. In addition, country differences appear to influence the perception of the adversity of 
the situation. Although these results come from the particular context of international strategic 
alliances, they provide valuable insights into the effect of national culture on response behavior in 
general. Response strategies share similarities with coping strategies (e.g., Radford et al., 1993) 
and conflict resolution styles (e.g., Morris et al., 1998), which also entail active–passive and 
constructive–destructive behaviors. Thus, our findings about the differential effects of country 
may apply in these contexts too, though this assertion requires empirical confirmation. 
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Table 1. Scores of Hofstede’s Four Cultural Dimensions by Country 
 
Country 
Individualism–
Collectivism 
Masculinity–
Femininity 
Power 
Distance 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Japan 46 M 95 H 54 M 92 H 
The Netherlands 80 H 14 L 38 L 53 M-L 
Switzerland (French-
speaking part) 
64 M-H 58 M 70 H 70 M-H 
Turkey 37 L 45 M 66 H 85 H 
United Kingdom 89 H 66 H 35 L 35 L 
Mean 51  51  51  64  
Notes: H = high, M = medium, L = low. 
Source: Hofstede, 2001. 
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Table 4. Construct Reliability and Partial Correlation Matrices 
A. Japan 
Response Strategy Mean s.d. α CR AVE  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Exit 3.57 1.44 .86 .86 .68        
2 Opportunism 3.01 1.23 .74 .74 .49  .25***      
3 Aggressive voice 4.48 1.00 .60 .60 .34  .15* .31***     
4 Creative voice 5.35 1.07 .84 .85 .68  -.25*** -.26*** .13*    
5 Considerate voice 5.22 1.11 .75 .75 .51  -.48*** -.28*** .04 .60***   
6 Patience 2.31 1.10 .76 .76 .51  .05 .38*** .01 -.35*** -.22***  
7 Neglect 2.25 1.10 .80 .80 .58  .25*** .42*** -.01 -.45*** -.43*** .69*** 
n = 262. 
B. The Netherlands 
Response Strategy Mean s.d. α CR AVE  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Exit 3.09 1.40 .89 .89 .73        
2 Opportunism 3.48 1.19 .70 .71 .45  .25***      
3 Aggressive voice 4.54 1.06 .74 .74 .49  .20*** .48***     
4 Creative voice 5.56 .86 .81 .82 .61  -.30*** -.07 .06    
5 Considerate voice 5.54 .87 .75 .75 .49  -.47*** -.11* -.01 .55***   
6 Patience 1.92 .82 .74 .75 .50  -.07 .04 -.12* -.20*** -.10†  
7 Neglect 2.14 .87 .71 .71 .45  .22*** .12* -.01 -.37*** -.32*** .46*** 
n = 334.  
C. Switzerland 
Response Strategy Mean s.d. α CR AVE  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Exit 2.95 1.44 .89 .89 .73        
2 Opportunism 3.28 1.24 .72 .74 .49  .06      
3 Aggressive voice 4.11 1.09 .72 .72 .47  .09 .41***     
4 Creative voice 5.54 .88 .78 .80 .59  -.42*** -.06 .08    
5 Considerate voice 5.37 .99 .72 .72 .46  -.47*** -.16** .01 .60***   
6 Patience 1.92 .92 .77 .77 .53  .01 .21*** -.02 -.27*** -.24***  
7 Neglect 2.22 .99 .77 .77 .53  .34*** .35*** .08 -.47*** -.50*** .51*** 
n = 255.  
D. Turkey 
Response Strategy Mean s.d. α CR AVE  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Exit 3.13 1.31 .82 .83 .61        
2 Opportunism 3.85 1.22 .67 .69 .43  .10†      
3 Aggressive voice 4.40 1.04 .68 .68 .41  .03 .32***     
4 Creative voice 5.27 1.06 .78 .81 .59  -.40*** .08 .26***    
5 Considerate voice 5.15 1.02 .68 .68 .42  -.48*** -.04 .15* .72***   
6 Patience 2.32 1.17 .78 .78 .54  .23*** .09 -.11† -.37*** -.30***  
7 Neglect 2.58 1.17 .71 .71 .45  .48*** .11 -.06 -.57*** -.55*** .59*** 
n = 278.  
E. United Kingdom 
Response Strategy Mean s.d. α CR AVE  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Exit 3.76 .80 .68 .69 .43        
2 Opportunism 3.76 .68 .69 .69 .43  .07      
3 Aggressive voice 4.78 .69 .77 .77 .53  .12† -.01     
4 Creative voice 5.70 .65 .68 .68 .41  .06 -.02 .14*    
5 Considerate voice 5.50 .74 .64 .64 .38  .03 .03 .01 .25***   
6 Patience 1.94 .65 .77 .78 .54  .12† -.02 -.02 -.28*** -.16*  
7 Neglect 2.20 .69 .64 .68 .44  -.02 .04 -.01 -.21** -.10 .38*** 
n = 250.  
Notes: s.d. = standard deviation. α = Cronbach’s alpha. CR = composite reliability. AVE = average variance 
extracted.  
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Interaction Effects between Exchange Variables and Countries 
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APPENDIX: SCENARIO TEXTS 
General Introduction 
Imagine that you are an alliance manager at a firm called BIOPHARM. As an alliance manager you are responsible for all of the 
strategic alliances BIOPHARM is engaged in. It is your job to assure that the performance of each alliance meets BIOPHARM’s 
expectations. You have the authority and power to make any necessary decisions concerning the future of these alliances. In 
BIOPHARM’s portfolio of alliances, one of the alliances is an international alliance with a foreign partner, STARTECH. This 
alliance was established five years ago and is equally important for both companies.  
 
Manipulations Texts 
Economic satisfaction 
Positive Negative 
During the past year, the benefits BIOPHARM derived through the 
STARTECH alliance met the firm’s expectations. The financial 
objectives BIOPHARM had set were fully attained. More 
specifically, the alliance generated more revenues for BIOPHARM 
than it had initially expected. 
During the past year BIOPHARM’s benefits from the STARTECH 
alliance did not meet the firm’s expectations. The financial 
objectives BIOPHARM had set were not fully attained. More 
specifically, the alliance generated fewer revenues for BIOPHARM 
than it had initially expected.  
 
Social satisfaction 
Positive Negative 
Up until now, STARTECH has been very cooperative and flexible 
when making necessary adjustments to the alliance. For example, 
necessary renegotiations to change contractual clauses were usually 
settled quickly. Consequently, the working relationship with 
STARTECH went very smoothly as both partners trusted one 
another completely and BIOPHARM did not need to allocate 
additional resources to monitor the alliance.  
Up until now, STARTECH has not been very cooperative and 
flexible when making necessary adjustments to the alliance. For 
example, on one occasion it took extensive renegotiations to change 
some minor contractual clauses. Consequently, the working 
relationship with STARTECH became more troublesome since both 
partners started to distrust one another and BIOPHARM had to 
allocate additional resources to monitor the alliance.  
 
Alliance specific investments 
Positive Negative 
In the past, BIOPHARM made some minor reusable investments to 
make the alliance with STARTECH work. For example, 
BIOPHARM has invested into a database, which is useful with or 
without the STARTECH alliance. In addition, only few additional 
costs are to be expected if BIOPHARM should terminate the 
STARTECH alliance. For example, no penalty fee would have to be 
paid to STARTECH if BIOPHARM prematurely ends the alliance. 
In the past, BIOPHARM made substantial specialized investments 
that would be lost if the STARTECH alliance were to be terminated. 
For example, BIOPHARM has invested into a tailor-made database, 
which is only useful, if exploited together with STARTECH. In 
addition, substantial costs can be expected if BIOPHARM should 
end the STARTECH alliance. For example, a high penalty fee has to 
be paid to STARTECH if BIOPHARM prematurely ends the 
alliance. 
 
Alternatives availability  
Positive Negative 
At this moment, BIOPHARM has plentiful alternatives available. 
For example, launching a new product without STARTECH can be 
considered as a serious alternative. Moreover, developing new 
products without STARTECH’s help is possible with only a few 
additional investments. In addition, various other firms can be 
viewed as potential partners to replace STARTECH and these firms 
are interested in forming an alliance with BIOPHARM.  
At this moment, BIOPHARM has few serious alternatives available. 
For example, launching a new product without STARTECH is too 
risky. Moreover, developing new products without STARTECH’s 
help is too costly, as substantial investments would be required. In 
addition, only a few other firms can be viewed as potential partners 
to replace STARTECH. In addition, most of these firms are already 
engaged in other alliances with BIOPHARM’s competitors.  
 
 
